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Abstract
Should asset testing be used in means-tested programs? These programs
target low-income people, but low income can result not only from low produc-
tivity but also from low labor supply. We aim to show that in the asymmetric
information environment, there is a positive role for asset testing. We focus
on Medicaid, one of the largest means-tested programs in the US, and we
ask two questions: 1) Does Medicaid distort work incentives? 2) Can asset
testing improve the insurance-incentives trade-o of Medicaid? Our tool is
a general equilibrium model with heterogeneous agents that matches many
important features of the data. We nd that 23% of Medicaid enrollees do
not work in order to be eligible. These distortions are costly: if individuals'
productivity was observable and could be used to determine Medicaid eligi-
bility, this results in substantial ex-ante welfare gains. When productivity is
unobservable, asset testing is eective in eliminating labor supply distortions,
but to minimize saving distortions, asset limits should be dierent for work-
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1 Introduction
Should asset testing be used in means-tested programs? The total federal spending
on ten major means-tested programs and tax credits increased more than tenfold over
the last four decades, reaching $588 billion or 4% of GDP in 2012 (CBO, 2013). Yet,
little consensus exists on certain aspects of these programs' design, in particular, asset
testing. The overall trend over the last decade was toward abandoning the asset testing
policy, but the debate concerning its use continues. As a recent example, asset testing
for the food stamps program was one of the central issues in the debate over the 2014
Farm Bill.1
In this paper, we aim to show that there is a positive role for asset testing in the
asymmetric information environment. Means-tested programs target low-income people
by restricting its enrollees to earn less than a certain limit. This requirement prevents
high-income workers from obtaining public transfers, but it cannot guarantee that non-
workers with potential income above the income limit do not enroll. Because earning
ability is unobservable, once an individual with high labor income stops working, he is
indistinguishable from those whose potential labor income is low. In this environment,
asset testing can be used as an additional tool to improve the ability of means-tested
programs to target the most disadvantaged people.
We focus on Medicaid, which is one of the largest means-tested programs in the US
and also an important source of health insurance coverage for the non-elderly poor. The
fraction of workers among Medicaid enrollees is substantially lower than this fraction
among the rest of the population; on average, non-disabled Medicaid beneciaries are
twice less likely to work than people with private insurance or the uninsured.2 In this
paper, we ask two questions: 1) Does Medicaid signicantly distort work incentives? 2)
Can asset testing improve the insurance-incentives trade-o of Medicaid without changing
the amount of redistribution in the economy? More specically, our goal is to quantify
the distorting eects of Medicaid on work incentives, assess its welfare implications, and
illustrate how asset testing can mitigate these distortions. Our important contribution is
to show that work-dependent asset testing can eliminate labor supply distortions without
creating signicant distortions on savings.
Our approach is a quantitative general equilibrium model with the following key fea-
tures. First, we allow for heterogeneity of individuals along the dimensions of health,
productivity, and medical expense shocks. This allows us to capture the insurance role
of Medicaid for people with bad health, large medical shocks and/or low productivity.
1The 2014 Farm Bill reauthorized the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), formerly
known as the food stamps program. The House version of the Bill proposed to repeal the broad-based
categorical eligibility, which allows states to bypass asset testing when determining SNAP eligibility. In
contrast, the Senate version of the bill made no changes to the broad-based categorical eligibility
2Own calculations from Medical Expenditure Panel Survey dataset; see Section 5 for details.
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Second, we let health aect productivity and opportunity to access employer-based in-
surance, which allows us to model the selection of people with low attachment to the
labor force into Medicaid.3 Third, people in our model have several options to insure
against medical shocks: self-insurance, public health insurance, and private health insur-
ance (employer-based and individual). However, private health insurance is not easily
accessible for two reasons. First, employer-based insurance is only available for the subset
of the population working at rms that oer this type of insurance. Second, the indi-
vidual market is risk-rated, meaning that unhealthy people face high premiums. People
who want to obtain public insurance have to meet an income test and an asset test. Be-
cause labor income is endogenous, Medicaid beneciaries in our model include those who
have low earning ability and those who have relatively high earning ability but choose
not to work to be eligible. Fourth, we introduce disability shock into the model to be
able to separate disabled and non-disabled individuals in our analysis, i.e., to distinguish
between people who can work (and whose labor supply decisions can be distorted by the
Medicaid eligibility rules) and those who cannot (because they are disabled). Finally, we
model other non-Medicaid government means-tested programs to represent adequately
the public safety net existing in the economy.
We calibrate the model using the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS) dataset.
More specically, we require the model to reproduce the following key patterns of the
data separately for each health group: i) the life-cycle proles of health insurance take-
up, ii) the life-cycle proles of employment, iii) the average labor income proles for
all workers and for workers without employer-sponsored health insurance (ESHI). An
essential feature of our calibration is that we use our model to estimate the potential labor
income and chances to access ESHI of individuals whom we do not observe working in the
data. This is important for understanding how Medicaid aects labor supply decisions
because a large fraction of Medicaid beneciaries do not work.
Our ndings are as follows. First, around 23% of non-disabled Medicaid enrollees
would choose to work if they were able to keep their access to public insurance. The
majority of this group is unhealthy and has higher medical costs and higher assets than
other Medicaid enrollees.
Second, these distortions are important in welfare terms. If we remove the asymmetric
information problem, i.e., link Medicaid eligibility to (unobservable) exogenous produc-
tivity as opposed to (observable) endogenous labor income while keeping the budget of
public transfer programs constant, this will result in ex-ante welfare gains equivalent to
1.17% of annual consumption.
3In the data, 43.2% of non-disabled Medicaid beneciaries are unhealthy, whereas the unhealthy
among the privately insured and the uninsured account for only 13% and 24.5%, respectively. In addition,
unhealthy people are less likely to be covered by employer-based health insurance. Only 48% of the
unhealthy are covered by employer-based health insurance compared with 67% among the healthy.
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Third, we study how asset testing can be used to reduce the labor supply distortions
when productivity is unobservable. We show that strict asset testing (with the asset
limit equal to $2,000) can almost completely eliminate the moral hazard problem; the
percentage of Medicaid beneciaries who stop working to obtain Medicaid decreases from
23% to 1%. However, this reduction in labor supply distortions comes at the cost of large
saving distortions that substantially decrease the welfare gains of this policy. In contrast,
if asset limits are allowed to be dierent for workers and non-workers, asset testing can
achieve an outcome that is very close to the \ideal" case of observable productivity. This
happens because strict asset testing of non-workers prevents highly productive individuals
from using the following strategy: stop working, claim Medicaid and then use their
accumulated assets to smooth consumption. In contrast, loosening asset limits on working
beneciaries relieves saving distortions for individuals who do not \game" Medicaid rules
by lowering their labor supply.4
The results of our policy analysis can reconcile the opposite ndings from three recent
empirical studies that examine the eect of public insurance on labor supply using changes
in the Medicaid expansion programs in three states. Garthwaite et al. (2014) and Dague
et al. (2013) nd that Medicaid has a large eect on labor supply in Tennessee and
Wisconsin, respectively, whereas Baicker et al. (2014) conclude the opposite for the case
of Oregon. Importantly, the Medicaid expansion programs in Tennessee and Wisconsin
had no asset testing, while the program in Oregon imposed a strict asset limit of $2,000.
In light of our ndings, the dierent intensity of the moral hazard problem in these three
cases can be attributed to the dierence in the asset testing policies.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the related literature. Section
3 introduces the model. Section 4 explains our calibration. Section 5 compares the
performance of the model with the data. Section 6 presents the results. Section 7
discusses the role of asset testing. Section 8 relates our results to the recent empirical
ndings. Section 9 concludes.
2 Related literature
Our paper is related to several strands of literature. Our positive analysis is motivated
by the literature studying the labor supply eects of public means-tested programs (for
an extensive review, see Mott, 2002). A subset of this literature focuses on the Medicaid
program. Most of these studies use data prior to 1996, when adult eligibility for Medicaid
was tied to eligibility for another welfare program, Aid for Families with Dependent
4The mechanism behind work-dependent asset testing is analogous to the eect of earnings-dependent
wealth taxation advocated in several studies of optimal taxation (see, for example, Kocherlakota (2005)
and Albansei and Sleet (2006)).
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Children (AFDC).5;6 The close link between the two programs made it dicult to isolate
the eect of Medicaid on labor supply, and dierent identication strategies were used.
Mott and Wolfe (1992) exploit the variation in the valuation of Medicaid benets
and show that Medicaid has a signicant negative eect on labor force participation.
Blank (1989), Winkler (1991) and Montgomery and Navin (2000) use variations in the
generosity of Medicaid by state to evaluate its eect on labor supply. The rst study
nds no eect, while the last two studies nd small eects on labor force participation.
Yelowitz (1995) exploits the delinking of Medicaid from AFDC for children in the late
1980s and nds that this policy had a positive eect on labor force participation of
mothers. Decker (1993) and Strumpf (2011) examine the eects of the introduction of
the Medicaid program in the late 1960s and early 1970s on labor force participation;
both studies nd no eect. Dave et al. (2013) study the expansion of Medicaid to cover
the costs of pregnancy and childbirth that happened in the late 1980s and nd that this
policy signicantly decreased the probability that a woman who had recently given birth
was employed. Overall, the literature based on pre-1996 data provides mixed evidence
on the eects of Medicaid on labor supply. However, there is evidence that the decision
to participate in welfare programs was noticeably aected by the availability of health
insurance (Ellwood and Adams, 1990; Mott and Wolfe, 1992; Decker, 1993).
After the welfare reform of 1996, Medicaid and AFDC were separated and states
were allowed to determine their Medicaid eligibility criteria. To our knowledge, four
studies examine the eect of Medicaid on labor supply using data from after the welfare
reform of 1996. Garthwaite et al. (2014) examine the consequences of a sharp reduction
of the state Medicaid expansion program in Tennessee in 2005, when a large number
of people were disenrolled within a period of less than a year. They nd a signicant
increase in employment among the group who lost coverage. Dague et al. (2013) study
the Medicaid expansion program in Wisconsin and nd that it signicantly reduces labor
supply among its enrollees. Baicker et al. (2014) use the data from the Oregon Health
Insurance experiment and nd that public insurance does not aect labor supply. In
Section 8, we discuss how our results can reconcile these opposite ndings. Finally,
Pohl (2011) estimates a structural model using variation in Medicaid policies across
states and nds that some groups of population are signicantly less likely to work to
be eligible for Medicaid. Similar to the latter study, our paper addresses this question in
a structural framework using post-1996 data. However, we allow for the coexistence of
self-insurance, several types of private health insurance and public insurance. We show
that the interaction of self-insurance and labor supply distortions is important for our
5Currently this program is substituted by the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF).
6At the end of the 1980s, Medicaid was expanded to cover pregnant women regardless of their par-
ticipation in welfare.
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normative analysis.
The normative analysis of our paper is related to the literature studying how to e-
ciently provide insurance in dynamic economies with private information (this literature
is often referred to as New Dynamic Public Finance (NDPF)).7 A primary focus of these
studies is constrained-ecient allocations that solve the planning problem with incentive
compatibility constraints arising from information asymmetry. These allocations imply
that marginal decisions of agents should be distorted compared with the case of full in-
formation. In particular, savings should be discouraged by creating a wedge between the
intertemporal marginal rate of substitution and the aggregate return on capital. This is
done to minimize the adverse eect of savings on work incentives. Studies that derive
how optimal allocations can be implemented show that in certain environments, the op-
timal wedge on savings can be achieved by asset testing (Golosov and Tsyvinski, 2006)
or by wealth taxes that negatively depend on labor income (Kocherlkota, 2005; Albanesi
and Sleet, 2006). The former study shows that introducing asset testing to disability
insurance results in substantial welfare gains. Based on the ndings of these studies, we
provide a quantitative analysis of the eects of uniform asset testing and asset testing
that depends on labor supply decisions.
Methodologically, we relate to two groups of studies. First, we relate to models with
incomplete labor markets augmented by health and medical expense uncertainty and
allowing for endogenous health insurance decisions (Kitao and Jeske, 2009, Hansen et
al., 2014, Hsu, 2013, Pashchenko and Porapakkarm, 2013). Second, we relate to life-
cycle structural models featuring health uncertainty (Capatina, 2015, De Nardi, French,
Jones, 2010, French, 2005, Nakajima and Telyukova, 2011). Following the rst group of
studies, we use a general equilibrium framework, meaning that all aggregate variables
(e.g., the ESHI premium and taxes) are endogenous. Similar to the second group of
studies, we allow for rich heterogeneity and impose a strict discipline on the model by
requiring it to reproduce the behavior of each subgroup of agents as in the data.
3 Baseline Model
3.1 Households
3.1.1 Demographics and preferences
The economy is populated by overlapping generations of individuals. A model period
is one year.8 An individual lives to a maximum of N periods. During the rst R   1
7Kocherlakota (2010) and Golosov, Tsyvinsky and Werning (2010) provide an extensive review.
8In most states, the renewal period for Medicaid is 12 months. A typical private health insurance
contract also lasts for one year.
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periods of life, an individual can choose whether to work, and at age R, all individuals
retire.
At age t, an agent's health condition ht can be either good (ht = 1) or bad (ht = 0).
Health condition evolves according to an age-dependent Markov process, Ht(htjht 1).
Health aects productivity, survival probability, and medical expenses. In addition,
unhealthy individuals can become disabled.
An individual is endowed with one unit of time that can be used for either leisure or
work. Labor supply (lt) is indivisible; lt 2

0; l
	
.9 Work brings disutility modeled as a
xed cost of leisure w. We assume the Cobb-Douglas specication for preferences over
consumption and leisure:
u(ct; lt) =

ct
 
1  lt   w1flt>0g
1 1 
1   ;
where 1f:g is an indicator function mapping to one if its argument is true. Here,  is
a parameter determining the relative weight of consumption, and  is the risk-aversion
over the consumption-leisure composite.
Agents discount the future at rate  and survive until the next period with condi-
tional probability ht , which depends on age and health. We assume that the savings of
households who do not survive are taxed away by the government. The population grows
at rate .
3.1.2 Medical expenditures and health insurance
Each period, an agent faces a medical expenditure shock. The realized medical ex-
pense shock (xt) depends on age, health condition, and previous medical expense. More
specically, we assume that medical expenditure shock evolves according to a three-state
Markov process, and the value of each state depends on age (t) and health condition (ht).
The transition matrix Gt(xtjxt 1) is age-dependent.
Every non-disabled individual of a working age can buy health insurance against
medical shocks in the individual health insurance market. The price of health insurance
in the individual market depends on the expected medical expenses, thus being a function
of age, health condition and medical expense realized in the previous period. We denote
the individual market price as pI (ht 1; xt 1; t).
9We assume indivisible labor supply because the evidence that low-income earners demonstrate sig-
nicant response to public policies along the extensive margin is more prevalent than is such evidence
for the intensive margin response (Heckman, 1993, Kleven and Kreiner, 2005, Saez, 2002). In addition,
in the data, the dierence in labor supply between the healthy and the unhealthy is more pronounced
along the extensive margin. In our sample, conditional on working, the average worked hours are 2053
and 2174 for the unhealthy and the healthy, respectively, whereas the median worked hours is 2080 for
both the healthy and the unhealthy.
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Every period, a working-age individual receives an oer to buy employer-sponsored
health insurance (ESHI) with probability Probt, which depends on age, income, and
health.10 The variable gt characterizes the status of the oer: gt = 1 if an individual
gets an oer, and gt = 0 if he does not. All participants of the employer-based pool
are charged the same premium p regardless of their health and age. Since an employer
who oers ESHI pays a fraction  of this premium, a worker who chooses to buy group
insurance only pays p where:
p = (1   ) p:
Low-income non-disabled individuals of a working age can obtain health insurance
from Medicaid for free. There are two pathways to qualify for Medicaid. First, an
individual is eligible if his total income is below the threshold ycat and his assets are
less than the limit kcat. We call this pathway \categorical eligibility".11 Second, an
individual can become eligible through the Medically Needy program. This happens if
his total income minus the out-of-pocket medical expenses is below the threshold yMN
and his assets are less than the limit kMN . We call this pathway \eligibility based on
medical need".
All types of insurance contracts - group, individual, and public - provide only partial
insurance against medical expenditure shocks. We denote by q (xt; it) the fraction of
medical expenditures covered by an insurance contract. This fraction is a function of
medical expenditures and insurance choice (it).
Disabled and retired individuals are covered by the Medicare program.12 The Medi-
care program pays a fraction qMCR of medical costs.
10This assumption is used to replicate the empirical fact that healthy and high-income people are
much more likely to be covered by ESHI. Note that health insurance is part of the overall compensation
package and that healthier individuals, on average, receive better compensation (the so-called income-
health gradient; see Cutler, Lleras-Muney and Vogl (2011) for a review). The direction of causality
between health and probability to be covered by ESHI can run both ways; healthier individuals receive
better compensation or individuals covered by ESHI become healthier. For model tractability, we do
not model the endogenous evolution of health. What is important for our analysis, is to capture the fact
that dierent insurance groups have dierent health compositions (see Table 4). Assuming that health
aects ESHI oer probability allows us to incorporate this mechanism in the model in a tractable way.
11Medicaid eligibility can also be linked to family status; the federal regulation requires states to
cover certain categories of the population - individuals with dependent children and low-income disabled
individuals. We abstract from family status because many states have additional eligibility pathways
for childless adults. In 2008, 23 states and the District of Columbia operated programs for low-income
childless adults (Klein and Schwartz, 2008). The nancing of these programs comes from state funding
or through Medicaid x1115 waivers. In our sample, 43% of non-disabled Medicaid beneciaries do not
have dependent children (dened as children younger than 18 years of age). Thus, introducing a tight
link between Medicaid eligibility and family status can signicantly underestimate the extent to which
this program is available to some categories of the population.
12There is a 24-month waiting period to be covered by Medicare for a new awardee into the Disability
Insurance program. We abstract from the waiting period to simplify the problem of disabled individuals.
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3.1.3 Labor income
The household's earnings are equal to ewzht lt, where ew is eective wage and zht is
idiosyncratic productivity, which takes the following form:
zht = 
h
tt: (1)
Here, ht is the deterministic function of age and health condition realized at the end of
the previous period, and t is the stochastic shock described in Section 4.9. We allow
the household's productivity to be aected by health because in the data, the average
labor income of unhealthy workers is signicantly lower than the average labor income
of healthy workers.
3.1.4 Disability shock
Unhealthy individuals of a working age can become disabled with an age-dependent
probability dt. Because low-income people are more likely to become disabled (Low and
Pistaferri, 2015), we allow disability shock to be correlated with the realized productivity
in the previous period. We assume that disability is an absorbing state, i.e., an individual
who becomes disabled stays disabled (and unhealthy) for the rest of his life.13 Disabled
individuals have zero productivity (zht = 0) and thus cannot work.
14
3.1.5 Taxation and social transfers
All households pay an income tax T (yt) that consists of two parts: a progressive
tax and a proportional tax.15 Taxable income yt is based on both labor and capital
income. Working households also pay payroll taxes: Medicare tax (MCR) and Social
Security tax ( ss). The Social Security tax rate for earnings above yss is zero. The U.S.
tax code allows households to exclude out-of-pocket medical expenditures (including
insurance premiums) that exceed 7:5% of their income when calculating their taxable
13We assume that the healthy face zero probability to become disabled (dt = 0) because in the data,
very few healthy individuals receive DI benets or report having work limitations. We discuss this issue
more in the calibration section. We assume that disability is an absorbing state because the exit rate
from the DI program due to recovery is very low. In 2004, only 0.9% of beneciaries exited the DI
program due to recovery (Zayatz, 2011). In this assumption, we follow Golosov and Tsyvinski (2005)
and Kitao (2015).
14We abstract from possible moral hazard in the DI program (that able individuals can pretend to be
disabled), because this would signicantly increase the model's complexity; we need to incorporate the
decisions to apply for the DI and the entire complexity of the DI screening and award rules. Instead,
our goal is to understand the role of asset testing in public transfer programs targeted at low-income
non-disabled individuals.
15The progressive part approximates the actual income tax schedule in the U.S., whereas the propor-
tional tax represents all other taxes that we do not model explicitly. In this approach we follow Jeske
and Kitao (2009).
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income. In addition, the ESHI premium (p) is tax-deductible in both income and payroll
tax calculations. Consumption is taxed at a proportional rate of  c.
We also assume a public safety-net program, T SIt . This program guarantees every
household a minimum consumption level c, which reects the option available to low-
income households in the US and/or households with high medical expenses to rely on
general public transfer programs such as food stamps, Supplemental Security Income,
and uncompensated care.16 For the retired and the disabled, T SIt also includes Medicaid
transfers since we do not explicitly model Medicaid insurance for these two groups.
Retired households receive Social Security benets ss. In practice, these payments
depend on the highest 35 years of earnings. To minimize the number of state variables,
we allow ss to depend only on the xed productivity type, which is part of the stochastic
component of productivity t (see Section 4.9). More specically, ss is determined by
applying the Social Security benet formula to the average lifetime earnings over the
highest 35 years of earnings of individuals with a particular xed productivity type.
All disabled individuals receive Disability Insurance (DI) payments. Similar to Social
Security benets, in practice these payments depend on the average earnings before the
onset of disability. To avoid keeping track of the history of earnings, we abstract from
the heterogeneity in DI income and assume that all disabled individuals receive the same
payments DI xed throughout their lifetime.
3.1.6 Timing of the model
The timing of the model is as follows. At the beginning of the period, disability
shock is realized. Next, individuals who stay able learn their productivity and ESHI
oer status. Based on this information, an individual decides his labor supply (lt) and
insurance choice (it). If he is categorically eligible, he can choose to enroll in Medicaid
(M). If he is not eligible or decides not to enroll in Medicaid, he can choose to buy
individual insurance (I) ; to buy employer-based group insurance (G) if oered, or to
remain uninsured (U). At the end of the period, the new health status (ht) and medical
expenses shock (xt) are realized. At this point, an uninsured household can become
eligible for the Medically Needy (MN) program after he has spent down his income to
pay his medical expenses until he has reached the level of the Medically Needy eligibility
threshold. We use a variable iMNt to indicate whether an uninsured individual becomes
eligible for the Medical Needy program after his medical shock is realized; iMNt = 1 if an
individual becomes eligible, otherwise iMNt = 0. After paying the out-of-pocket medical
expenses, an individual chooses his consumption (ct) and savings for the next period
(kt+1). The problem of disabled and retired individuals is simpler; they only choose
16In 2004 85% of the uncompensated care were paid by the government. The major portion was from
the disproportionate share hospital (DSH) payment (Kaiser Family Foundation, 2004).
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consumption and savings for the next period.
3.1.7 Optimization problem
Non-disabled individuals of a working age (t < R). At the beginning of each
period, the state variables for a non-disabled household are capital (kt 2 K =R+ [ f0g),
health and medical shock realized at the end of the last period (ht 1 2 H = f0; 1g,
xt 1 2 X =R+ [ f0g), idiosyncratic labor productivity
 
zht 2 Z =R+

, ESHI oer status
(gt 2 G = f0; 1g), and age (t 2 T = f1; 2; :::; R  1g). His value function at the beginning
of period t is:
Vt
 
kt; ht 1; xt 1;zht ; gt

= max
lt;iH
X
ht;xt
Ht (htjht 1)Gt (xtjxt 1)W flt;iHgt
 
kt; ht 1; xt 1; zht ; gt;ht; xt

(2)
where
W
flt;iHg
t
 
kt; ht 1; xt 1; zht ; gt;ht; xt

= (3)
max
ct;kt+1
u (ct; lt) + 
h
t

(1  dt+1)EtVt+1
 
kt+1; ht; xt; z
h
t+1; gt+1

+ dt+1V
D
t+1 (kt+1; xt)

subject to
kt (1 + r) + ewzht lt + T SI = kt+1 + (1 +  c) ct + Tax+ Pt +Xt (4)
ew = ( w ; if gt = 0
(w   cE) ; if gt = 1
)
(5)
Pt =
8>>><>>>:
0 ; if it 2 fU;Mg
pI (ht 1; xt 1; t) ; if it 2 fIg
p ; if it 2 fGg
(6)
T SIt = max
 
0; (1 +  c) c+ Tax+ Pt +Xt   kt (1 + r)  ewzht lt (7)
Tax = T (yt) + MCR
  ewzht lt   p1fit=Gg+  ssmin  ewzht lt   p1fit=Gg; yss (8)
yt = max
 
0; ktr + ewzht lt   p1fit=Gg  max 0; Xt + pI (ht 1; xt 1; t)1fit=Ig   0:075(ktr + ewzht lt)
(9)
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Xt =
8>>><>>>:
xt (1  q (xt; it)) if it = fM; I;Gg
xt (1  q (xt;M)) + max
 
0; ktr + ewzht lt   yMNq (xt;M) if it = fUg and iMNt = 1
xt if it = fUg and iMNt = 0
(10)
An individual is eligible for Medicaid if
ktr + ew zht lt  ycat and kt  kcat for categorial eligibility,
ktr + ew zht lt   xt  yMN and kt  kMN for the Medically Needy program. (11)
W
flt;iHg
t is the interim value function conditional on the labor supply and insurance
choices after the new health condition and medical expenses are realized. The conditional
expectation on the right-hand side of Eq. (3) is over

zht+1; gt+1
	
. V Dt+1 is the value
function of an individual who becomes disabled next period. Eq. (4) is the budget
constraint. In Eq. (5), w is wage per eective labor unit. If a household has an ESHI
oer, his employer pays part of his insurance premium. We assume that the rm oering
ESHI passes the costs of the employer's contribution to its workers by deducting an
amount cE from the wage per eective labor unit. In Eq. (8), the rst term is income
tax and the last two terms are payroll taxes.17 Eq. (10) describes out-of-pocket medical
expenses, Xt, which depend on insurance status. It takes into account that an uninsured
person who becomes eligible for the Medically Needy program has to rst spend down
his income before public insurance starts paying for his medical expenses.
Disabled individuals. The state variables of a disabled individual are assets (kt),
medical shock (xt 1) and age (t). Because a disabled individual is unhealthy (ht = 0)
and disability is an absorbing state, his value function is:
V Dt (kt; xt 1) =
X
xt
Gt (xtjxt 1)WDt (kt; xt)
WDt (kt; xt) = max
ct;kt+1
u (c; 0) + ht V
D
t+1 (kt+1; xt) (12)
subject to:
kt (1 + r) +DI + T
SI = kt+1 + (1 +  c) ct + T (yt) + pMCR + xt (1  qMCR) ; (13)
T SIt = max
 
0; (1 +  c) c+ T (yt) + pMCR + xt (1  qMCR)  kt (1 + r) DI

(14)
yt = ktr +DI  max
 
0; xt (1  qMCR)  0:075
 
ktr +DI

: (15)
17In practice, employers contribute 50% of Medicare and Social Security taxes. For simplicity, we
assume that employees pay 100% of payroll taxes.
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Retired non-disabled individuals (t  R). For a retired household who did not
receive disability shock during the working stage of his life cycle, the state variables are
assets (kt), health (ht 1), medical shock (xt 1), and age (t).18 The value function of a
retired household is:
Vt (kt; ht 1; xt 1) =
X
ht;xt
Ht (htjht 1)Gt (xtjxt 1)Wt (kt; ht; xt) :
where
Wt (kt; ht; xt) = max
ct;kt+1
u (c; 0) + ht Vt+1 (kt+1; ht; xt) (16)
subject to:
kt (1 + r) + ss+ T
SI = kt+1 + (1 +  c) ct + T (yt) + pMCR + xt (1  qMCR) (17)
T SIt = max (0; (1 +  c) c+ T (yt) + pMCR + xt (1  qMCR)  kt (1 + r)  ss) (18)
yt = ktr + ss max
 
0; xt (1  qMCR)  0:075 (ktr + ss)

(19)
Distribution of households. To simplify the notation, let S dene the space of a
household's state variables at the end of each period; SW = KHX ZGHXT
for working-age non-disabled individuals, SR = K  H  X  T for retired non-disabled
individuals, and SD= K X T for disabled individuals. Let s 2 S = SW [ SR [ SD, and
denote by  (s) the distribution of households over the state-space.
3.2 Production sector
There are two stand-in rms which act competitively. Their production functions
are Cobb-Douglas, AKL1 ; where K and L are aggregate capital and aggregate labor
and A is the total factor productivity. The rst stand-in rm oers ESHI to its workers,
but the second one does not. Under competitive behavior, the second rm pays each
employee his marginal product of labor. Because capital is freely allocated between the
two rms, the Cobb-Douglas production function implies that the capital-labor ratios of
both rms are the same. Consequently, we have
w = (1  )AKL ; (20)
r = AK 1L1    ; (21)
18As explained in Section 3.1.5, Social Security payments ss depend on the xed productivity type;
thus, xed productivity is also part of the state variables for retired households. We omit it from the
description of the optimization problem to simplify the notation.
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where  is the depreciation rate.
The rst rm has to partially nance the health insurance premium for its employees.
These costs are fully passed on to its employees through a wage reduction. In specifying
this wage reduction, we follow Jeske and Kitao (2009) : The rst rm subtracts an amount
cE from the marginal product per eective labor unit. The zero prot condition implies
cE =
 p
R
s2SW
1fit=Gg  (s)R
s2SW
ltzht 1fgt=1g  (s)
: (22)
The numerator is the total contributions toward the insurance premiums paid by the rst
rm. The denominator is the total eective labor in the rst rm.
3.3 Insurance sector
Health insurance companies in both private and group markets act competitively but
incur administrative costs when issuing an insurance contract. We assume that insurers
can observe all state variables that determine the future medical expenses of individuals.19
This assumption, together with the zero prot conditions, allows us to write insurance
premiums as follows:
pI (ht 1; xt 1; t) = EMt (ht 1; xt 1) + 'h (23)
for the non-group insurance market and
p = 
R
s2SW
1fit=GgEMt (ht 1; xt 1)   (s)R
s2SW
1fit=Gg  (s)
(24)
for the group insurance market. Here, EMt (ht 1; xt 1) is the expected medical cost to
an insurance company for an individual aged t whose last period health condition and
medical expense shock are ht 1 and xt 1, respectively:
EMt (ht 1; xt 1) =
X
ht;xt
xtq (xt; it)Gt(xtjxt 1)Ht (htjht 1) ; it 2 fI;Gg
The premium in the non-group insurance market is based on the expected medical
expenditure of an individual buyer. The premium for group insurance is based on the
weighted average of the expected medical costs of those who buy group insurance. In
19Before the Aordable Care Act of 2014, most states allowed insurance rms to medically underwrite
applicants for health insurance.
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Eqs. (23) and (24),  is a markup on premiums due to administrative costs. For individ-
ual insurance, there is a xed cost 'h representing the underwriting and other overhead
costs.20 Note that there is no xed cost in the group market because there is no under-
writing at the individual level and because overhead costs are spread over a large number
of pool participants. We allow the xed cost to dier by health to capture the following.
First, underwriting an unhealthy applicant can take more resources, e.g., to gather more
detailed medical records. Second, unhealthy individuals face additional frictions in the
individual market, for example, searching costs or a probability to be denied coverage
due to pre-existing conditions.21
3.4 Government constraint
We assume that the government runs a balanced budget. This assumption implies
that Z
s2SW
 
MCR
  ewzht lt   p1fit=Gg+  ssmin  ewzht lt   p1fit=Gg; yss  (s) + (25)Z
s2S
 
 cct + T (yt)

  (s) +
Z
s2SR[SD
pMCR  (s) +
Z
s2S
kt+1
 
1  ht

  (s) Gov =
Z
s2S
T SI  (s) +
Z
s2SR
ss  (s) +
Z
s2SD
DI  (s) +
Z
s2SR[SD
xtqMCR  (s) +
Z
s2SW
(xt  Xt)1fit=M or (it=U & iMNt =1)g  (s)
The left-hand side is the total tax revenue from all households (including assets of
the deceased) net of the exogenous government expenditures (Gov). The rst term on
the right-hand side is the cost of guaranteeing the minimum consumption oor for all
households. The second to forth terms are the expenditures on Social Security and
Medicare programs (both for the disabled and the retired). The last term is the cost of
Medicaid including the Medically Needy program for working-age households.
20The proportional markup  can also be interpreted as the extra prot of insurance companies if
the health insurance market is not perfectly competitive. The proportional markup and xed costs are
important when we bring the model to the data; if insurance contracts have no loads or xed costs, the
model will overestimate the empirical proles of individual insurance purchases.
21Equivalently, we could set xed cost to be the same for the healthy and the unhealthy, and assume
instead that unhealthy individuals were subject to persistent pre-existing condition shocks. However,
the explicit modeling of pre-existing conditions would require adding an additional state variable.
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3.5 Denition of stationary competitive equilibrium
Given the government programs

c; ss;DI; qMCR; pMCR; y
cat; kcat; yMN ; kMN ; Gov
	
,
the fraction of medical costs covered by private insurers and Medicaid fq (xt; it)g ; and
the employers' contribution ( ) ; the competitive equilibrium of this economy consists of
a set of time-invariant prices fw; r; p; pI (ht 1; xt 1; t)g, wage reduction fcEg, households'
value functions

Vt (s) ; V
D
t (s)
	
; decision rules fkt+1 (s) ; ct (s) ; lt (s) ; it (s)g for working-
age non-disabled households and fct (s) ; kt+1 (s)g for retired and disabled individuals,
and tax functions fT (y) ; med;  ss;  cg such that the following conditions are satised:
1. Given a set of prices and the tax functions, the decision rules solve the households'
optimization problems in Eqs. (2); (12) ; and (16).
2. Wage (w) and rent (r) satisfy Eqs. (20) and (21) ; where
K =
Z
s2S
ht kt+1  (s) ; L =
Z
s2SW
zht lt  (s) :
3. cE satises Eq. (22); thus, the rm oering ESHI earns zero prot.
4. The non-group insurance premiums pI (ht 1; xt 1; t) satisfy Eq. (23), and the group
insurance premium satises Eq. (24); therefore, health insurance companies earn
zero prot.
5. The tax functions fT (y) ; MCR;  ss;  cg balance the government budget Eq. (25).
4 Data and calibration
We calibrate the model using the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS) dataset.
The MEPS collects detailed records on demographics, income, medical costs and insur-
ance for a nationally representative sample of households. It consists of two-year over-
lapping panels and covers the period from 1996 to 2013. For each wave, each person
is interviewed ve rounds over the two-year period. We use fourteen waves of MEPS
(1999-2013). We use the cross-sectional weights and longitudinal weights provided in
MEPS for the cross-sectional and longitudinal pools, respectively. Because each wave is
a representation of the population in that year, when pooling several years (or waves)
together, the weight of each individual was divided by the number of years (or waves).
We use 2004 as the base year. All level variables were normalized to the base year using
the Consumer Price Index (CPI).
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4.1 Sample selection
In MEPS, people are linked into one household based on eligibility for coverage under
a typical family insurance plan. This Health Insurance Eligibility Unit (HIEU) dened
in the MEPS dataset corresponds to our denition of a household. In our model, a
household is a single unit; therefore, we include only heads of the HIEU. We dene the
head as the person with the highest income in the HIEU.22
We start by constructing a two-year balanced panel that includes household heads
who are at least 24 years old and who have no missing information on self-reported health
status, health insurance status, and medical expenses. There are 86,797 individuals (or
173,594 individual-year observations) meeting our criteria. We drop 999 individuals who
are covered by public health insurance that is neither Medicaid nor Medicare. In addition,
we drop 1,577 individuals who are younger than 62 years old and do not receive Social
Security income but report receiving Medicare. We do this because Medicare covers
non-elderly people only if they are awarded social security disability insurance benets.23
The resulting sample size is 84,221 individuals (or 168,442 individual-year observations).
Table 1 shows the sample size by wave.
year 99/00 00/01 01/02 02/03 03/04 04/05 05/06 06/07 07/08 08/09 09/10 10/11 11/12 12/13
sample size 4,790 3,814 7,682 5,797 5,930 5,891 5,732 6,188 4,693 6,796 6,447 5,749 7,465 7,247
Table 1: Number of individuals in our sample by wave of the MEPS (1999-2013)
4.2 Demographics, preferences and technology
In the model, agents are born at age 25 and can live to a maximum age of 99. Since
the model period is one year, the maximum lifespan N is 75. Agents retire at the age
of 65, so R is 41. The population growth rate was set to 0.7% to match the fraction of
people older than 65 in the data.
We set the consumption share in the utility function  to 0.6, which is within the range
estimated by French (2005).24 The parameter  is set to 2.50, which facilitates matching
the age prole of the fraction of people with individual insurance. This corresponds to
22If we do not limit our sample to the heads of the households, we have to include dependents whose
only source of income is transfers from a spouse. There are two ways to model correctly the behavior of
these individuals: i) consider intrafamily decisions, ii) allow individuals to receive exogenous non-earned
income that approximates transfers from a spouse. The rst approach will make our computational
analysis intractable, and the second approach cannot be taken in a general equilibrium environment.
23There are several exceptions to this rule. For example, individuals with end stage renal disease can
obtain Medicare without being enrolled in the Disability Insurance program. However, these exceptions
are relatively rare.
24Given that we have an indivisible labor supply, we cannot pin down this parameter using a moment
in the data.
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the risk aversion over consumption equal to 1.90 ( cucc=uc = 1 (1 )). The discount
factor  is set to 0.9965 to match the capital-output ratio of 2.7, which is the average
ratio of private xed assets plus consumer durables to GDP from 2000 to 2011 (Bureau
of Economic Analysis). We set the labor supply of those who choose to work (l) to 0.4.
We dene a person as employed if he earns at least $2,678 per year in base year dollars
(this corresponds to working at least 10 hours per week and earning a minimum wage of
$5.15 per hour). Fixed leisure costs of work w are calibrated to match the employment
proles among healthy individuals.
The Cobb-Douglas function parameter  is set at 0.33, which corresponds to the
capital income share in the US. The annual depreciation rate  is set at 0.085 to match
the average ratio of private investments plus durable consumption expenses to GDP,
0.23%. (In a steady-state,  = I=Y
K=Y
= 0:23
2:7
:) Total factor productivity A is normalized so
that the total output equals one in the baseline model.
4.3 Health shock and disability shock
In MEPS, a person's self-reported health status is coded as 1 for excellent, 2 for very
good, 3 for good, 4 for fair and 5 for poor. We classify a person as being in bad health
if his average health score over that year is greater than 3.25
The health transition probability is parameterized as a polynomial function of age as
follows:
Ht (ht = 0jht 1 = 1) = GBt = aG0 + aG1 t+ aG2 t2;
Ht (ht = 0jht 1 = 0) = BBt = aB0 + aB1 t+ aB2 t2:
We estimate the probability to move from good to bad health directly from the data.
Specically, we compute GBt for ages 27, 32, 37,..., 82, 85+ using a sample in a 5-year
age bracket. For example, to obtain GBt for age 32, we use the sample in the age bracket
30-34 and measure the fraction of people whose health status changes from good to bad in
one year. Then, we estimate

aG0 ; a
G
1 ; a
G
2
	
to t these estimated points. For the transition
probability from bad to bad health, we estimate

aB0 ; a
B
1 ; a
B
2
	
by matching the fraction of
unhealthy people in our model to the fraction of unhealthy people in the data. We could
25We classify individuals into good and bad health status based on a self-reported health measure. In
this approach, we follow other quantitative life-cycle models with health and medical expense uncertainty,
e.g., French (2005), De Nardi et al. (2010), Capatina (2015), and Kitao (2009). The self-reported health
in MEPS is consistent with a more objective measure of health, the Physical Component Summary
(PCS) score, which is based on a 12-item short questionnaire: individuals whom we classify as unhealthy
have signicantly lower PCS scores. In addition, our approach allows us to combine MEPS and Health
and Retirement Study (HRS) when estimating the survival probabilities by health because the latter
dataset also contains a self-reported health variable. Attanasio et al. (2011) show that the distribution
of self-reported health is similar across the two datasets.
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also estimate

aB0 ; a
B
1 ; a
B
2
	
directly from the data as we did for parameters

aG0 ; a
G
1 ; a
G
2
	
.
We did not choose this approach because of the small sample size of unhealthy individuals,
particulary among younger groups.
To adjust conditional survival probabilities ht for the dierence in health, we follow
Attanasio et al. (2011). In particular, we use the Health and Retirement Survey (HRS)
to estimate the dierence in survival probabilities for people in dierent health categories
and then adjust the male life tables from the Social Security Administration. Appendix
B explains in more detail how we adjust the survival probability.
In our model, disabled individuals are those who permanently lose their productivity
and cannot work. To construct a sample of individuals who correspond to this denition,
we use two criteria. First, an individual has to receive Social Security income or Supple-
mental Security Income (variables SSECP and SSIP). Second, an individual has to report
having a work limitation in at least one interview round for two consecutive years (vari-
able WRKLIM). MEPS does not have information on whether a person receives Social
Security income because he is in the DI program or because he claimed Social Security
benets early. Because of this, we can only identify DI payments for individuals younger
than 62 year old (the earliest age at which Social Security benets can be claimed). Thus,
in our calibration, we restrict some targeted age-proles to ages between 25 and 61.
We assign the probability to become disabled equal to zero for the healthy. We do
this because in MEPS, less than 1% of individuals whose health is excellent, very good
or good between ages 25 and 61 years old report having work limitations or receiving
Social Security income. Moreover, conditional on being healthy, the probability to have
a work limitation and receive Social Security income in the following year among people
aged 25 to 61 years old is only 0.15%.
We specify the probability to receive disability shock as a logistic function:
dt =
exp
 
aD0t   aD1t log
 
zht 1

1 + exp
 
aD0t   aD1t log
 
zht 1
 ; (26)
where the coecients depend on age. Because low-income individuals are more likely to
become disabled, we allow dt to depend on z
h
t 1. We estimate the parameters of Eq. (26)
inside the model as follows. The parameter aD0t is estimated by matching the fraction of
DI recipients in the model to this fraction in the data. The parameter aD1t is estimated by
matching the average DI payments in MEPS ($4,920). We do this in two steps. First, in
the US, the DI payments are determined by applying the Social Security benet formula
to the average lifetime earnings before the onset of disability. In our model, to reduce
the number of state variables, we use zht 1 to proxy for the average lifetime earnings
of an individual before the onset of disability, relying on the fact that the productivity
process is highly persistent. Thus, we apply the Social Security benet formula to the
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last productivity realization zht 1 of a newly disabled individual, which results in the
DI payment DIz.
26 Second, since in our model we abstract from heterogeneity in DI
payments (see Section 3.1.5), we dene the DI benets DI as the average of DIz over
all of the disabled. Thus, the DI payment in our model depends on the composition of
the disabled in terms of their previous productivity, and this composition depends on
the parameter aD1t. For example, if a
D
1t is zero, the probability to receive disability shock
does not depend on productivity meaning that high- and low-productivity individuals
are equally likely to become disabled. In this case, the DI payment in our model will be
too high compared with the data, and aD1t needs to be adjusted upwards. Note that in our
model, all of the disabled are unhealthy, disability is an absorbing state, and disability
shock is a function of labor productivity. Because of this,

aB0 ; a
B
1 ; a
B
2
	
,

aD0t; a
D
1t
	
, labor
productivity process zht and ESHI oer probability should be estimated simultaneously.
The estimation of the productivity process and ESHI oer probability are described in
Sections 4.8 and 4.9.
For the initial distribution of the unhealthy and the disabled, we use the distribution
of individuals aged 24-26 in the data. Figures (1) and (2) compare the fraction of the
unhealthy and the disabled for each age group in our model with the data.
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Figure 1: % of the unhealthy in the population
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Figure 2: % of disabled individuals among the
unhealthy
4.4 Taxes and government transfers
In specifying the tax function T (y) we use a nonlinear functional form as specied
by Gouveia and Strauss (1994), together with a linear income tax  y:
T (y) = a0

y   (y a1 + a2) 1=a1

+  yy
26We use the Social Security benet formula for 2004.
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The rst term captures progressive income tax and is commonly used in the quantita-
tive macroeconomic literature (for example, Conesa and Krueger, 2006; Jeske and Kitao,
2009). In this functional form, a0 controls the marginal tax rate faced by the highest in-
come group, a1 determines the curvature of marginal taxes, and a2 is a scaling parameter.
Following Gouveia and Strauss (1994), we set a0 and a1 to 0.258 and 0.768, respectively.
The parameter a2 is used to balance the government budget in the baseline economy. We
set the proportional income tax  y to 6.66% to match the fact that around 65% of tax
revenues come from progressive income taxes. In all experimental cases, we adjust the
proportional tax  y to balance the government budget.
The Medicare, Social Security and consumption tax rates were set to 2.9%, 12.4%
and 5.67%, respectively. The maximum taxable income for Social Security (yss) is set to
$84,900. The fraction of exogenous government expenses in GDP is 18.8%.
For retired individuals, the Social Security pension payments ss are calculated as
follows. For each xed productivity type, we compute the average labor income over
the 35 highest-earning years and then apply the Social Security benet formula. As
explained in Section 3.1.5, we do this to avoid keeping track of the average past earnings
as an additional state variable. For disabled individuals, we set DI to the average DI
payments in MEPS, which is $4,920 (see Section 4.3 for more details).
When calibrating the consumption minimum oor c, we use the fact that this safety
net has a signicant eect on labor supply decisions, particularly for the unhealthy and for
people with low productivity. We set the minimum consumption oor to $1,540 to match
the employment rate among Medicaid beneciaries.27 Our estimate of the consumption
oor is lower compared with other life-cycle models with medical expense shocks, e.g.,
De Nardi et al. (2010). This is because we explicitly model several safety net programs
(Disability Insurance and the Medically Needy programs), which are usually assumed to
be part of the minimum consumption guarantee.
The income eligibility threshold for the general Medicaid program (ycat) is set to
70.5% of the Federal Poverty Line (FPL) to match the life-cycle prole of the fraction
of people covered by Medicaid. The income eligibility threshold for the Medically Needy
program (yMN) is set to be the same as the threshold for the general Medicaid program
(ycat). We set the asset test limit for categorical eligibility (kcat) to $26,000 to match
the fraction of Medicaid enrollees aged 51-64 who have assets below $10,000. Table 2
compares the asset distribution of Medicaid enrollees aged 51-64 in our model with this
27An alternative strategy is to calibrate the minimum consumption oor to match the asset accumu-
lation among poor individuals. Although we do not pursue this strategy, our model can capture well
the left tail of the wealth distribution. Among people aged 25-64 in our model, the fraction of people
with zero assets, assets below $2,000, $5,000, $10,000, and $20,000 are 8.9%, 13.9%, 17.0%, 23.4%, and
32.3%, respectively. These fractions in the data are 9.5%, 12.8%, 16.9%, 21.1%, and 27.1%, respectively
(Survey of Consumer Finance, 2001-2007).
21
distribution in HRS. Finally, the asset limit for the Medically Needy program
 
kMN

is
taken from the data and is set to $2,000, which is the median asset limit in states that
had the Medically Needy program in 2009.28
Assets ($) Data (HRS 2000-2012) Baseline model
0 37% 48%
1,000 49% 52%
2,000 54% 56%
5,000 63% 61%
10,000 69% 70%
20,000 74% 78%
25,000 80% 94%
Table 2: Percentage of non-disabled Medicaid enrollees aged between 51 and 64 years old with assets
less than the amount in the rst column. Assets in the HRS are dened as total wealth net of debt.
Because wealth is measured at the household level, we divide it by two for married households.
4.5 Insurance status
In MEPS, the question about the source of insurance coverage is asked retrospectively
for each month of the year. We dene a person as having employer-based insurance if he
reports having ESHI for at least eight months of the year (variables PEGJA-PEGDE).
The same criterion is used when dening a person as having individual insurance (vari-
ables PRIJA-PRIDE). For those few individuals who switch sources of private coverage
during a year, we use the following denition of insurance status. If a person has both
ESHI and individual insurance in one year and each coverage lasts for eight months or
less, but the total duration of coverage lasts for more than eight months, we classify this
person as individually insured.29 We classify individuals who are not covered by private
insurance as publicly insured if they report having public insurance (variables PUBJA-
PUBDE) for at least one month. We classify individuals as publicly insured based on a
shorter coverage period than private insurance because of the Medically Needy program.
In the data (and in our model), an individual can be uninsured for part of the year and
then enroll in Medicaid through the Medically Needy program after experiencing a large
medical spending shock.
28Because the Medicaid program is administered at the state level, asset limits for categorical eligibility
vary by state; some states do not have an asset test, whereas some states have a tight asset test. As of
2004, 22 states did not have an asset test for adults (Heberlein et al., 2012). Because we abstract from
the state heterogeneity, our calibration strategy is to capture the overall restrictiveness of the Medicaid
eligibility rules and to approximate the wealth distribution among Medicaid enrollees. Since MEPS does
not contain information about assets, we use the HRS (version N), which has information about both
assets and health insurance status for individuals older than 51 years old. We take the asset limit for
the Medically Needy program from the data because it does not vary signicantly by state.
29The results do not signicantly change if we change the cuto point to 6 or 12 months.
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4.6 Medical expenditure and insurance coverage
Medical costs in our model correspond to the total paid medical expenditures in the
MEPS dataset (variable TOTEXP). These expenditures include not only out-of-pocket
medical expenses but also the costs covered by insurers. In our calibration, medical
expense shock is approximated by a 3-state discrete health- and age-dependent Markov
process. For each age and health status, these three states correspond to the average
medical expenses of the three groups: those with medical expenses below the 50th, 50th
to 95th, and above 95th percentiles, respectively.30 To construct the transition matrix,
we measure the fraction of people who move from one group to another between two
consecutive years separately for people of working age (25-64) and for retirees (65 or
older).31
We use MEPS to estimate the fraction of medical expenses covered by insurance poli-
cies q (xt; it). For retired households, we set qMCR to 0.5. More details on the estimation
of the medical shock process and the fraction of medical expenses covered by insurance
are available in Appendix C.
4.7 Insurance sector
The share of health insurance premium paid by the rm ( ) is set to 80%, which is in
the range of empirical employer's contribution rates (Kaiser Family Foundation, 2009).
We set the proportional load of insurance contracts () to 1.071. The xed costs for an
individual policy ('h) are set to $101 for the healthy and to $2,106 for the unhealthy.
The proportional load and xed costs are set to match the life-cycle prole of individual
insurance coverage among the healthy and the unhealthy.
30The MEPS tends to underestimate aggregate medical expenditures (Pashchenko and Porapakkarm,
2016). To bring aggregate medical expenses computed from the MEPS in line with the corresponding
statistics in the National Health Expenditure Account (NHEA), the estimated medical expenses were
multiplied by 1.60 for people younger than 65 years old and by 1.90 for people 65 or older. These
numbers correspond to the ratio of aggregate medical spending in NHEA divided by aggregate medical
spending in MEPS for people younger and older than 65 years old, respectively, averaged over the years
2002, 2004, 2006, 2008, and 2010 (the years when NHEA provides the aggregate statistics by age).
31We also tried estimating the transition matrix separately by current health status. Because the
estimates are not signicantly dierent, we pool both healthy and unhealthy groups together to get
more ecient estimates. We also assume that the medical shock process of the disabled is the same as
that of the non-disabled unhealthy due to the small sample size of the former group. Note that because
the disabled in our model always stay unhealthy, they face higher expected medical expenses than do
the non-disabled unhealthy.
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4.8 ESHI oer rate
We assume that the probability of receiving an oer of ESHI coverage is a logistic
function:
Probt =
exp(ut)
1 + exp(ut)
;
where the variable ut is an odds ratio that takes the following form:
ut = a
E
0t + a
E
1t1fht 1=0g + a
E
2t log(inct ) + a
E
3t log(inct )1fht 1=0g + a
E
4 1fgt 1=1g1ft>25g (27)
Here, aE0t; a
E
1t; a
E
2t; a
E
3t are age-dependent coecients, and inct is individual labor income.
This specication allows for a positive relationship between labor income and opportunity
to be covered by ESHI, as observed in the data. We include dummy coecients for bad
health to capture the lower opportunity to access ESHI for the unhealthy.
In general, we can estimate Eq. (27) directly from the data. However, there might be
a selection bias problem because people with an ESHI oer are more likely to work than
are those without an ESHI oer.32 Thus, a direct estimation from the data can overstate
the opportunity to receive an ESHI oer among groups with low labor force participation,
such as the unhealthy. To avoid this problem, we estimate this equation inside the model
together with the labor productivity process. This procedure is described in more detail
in the following subsection.
4.9 Labor productivity process
The productivity of individuals takes the following form:
zht = 
h
tt = 
h
t exp(vt) exp (t) exp() (28)
where ht is the deterministic component that depends on age and health, and the stochas-
tic component of productivity t consists of the persistent shock vt; temporary shock t;
and a xed productivity type :
vt = vt 1 + "t; "t  N(0; 2") (29)
t  N
 
0; 2

;   N(0; 2)
For the persistent shock vt, we set  to 0.98 and 
2
" to 0.02 following the incomplete
market literature (Storesletten et al., 2004; Hubbard et al., 1994; French, 2005). We set
the variance of the xed productivity type (2) to 0.242 and the variance of temporary
32See French and Jones (2011) for an investigation of the eect of employer-based health insurance on
decisions to work.
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shock
 
2

to 0.057, as in Storesletten et al. (2004). In our computation, we discretize
the shock processes using 9 gridpoints for vt and 2 gridpoints for t and . The grid
of vt is expanding over ages to capture the increasing cross-sectional variance. Because
our AR(1) process is highly persistent, we use the method in Floden (2008) for our
discretization: Our discretized process for vt generates the autocorrelation of 0.98 and
the innovation variance of 0.0175. To construct the distribution of newborn individuals,
we draw v1 in Eq. (29) from the N(0; 0:352
2) distribution following Heathcote et al.
(2010).33
To estimate the deterministic part of productivity ht , we need to take into account
the fact that in the data, we only observe labor income of workers and we do not know
the potential labor income of non-workers. Given that the fraction of workers among the
unhealthy is low, there can be a selection into employment. In addition, as mentioned
in the previous subsection, people with an ESHI oer are more likely to work than are
people without an ESHI oer. To avoid selection bias, we adapt the method developed
by French (2005). We start by estimating the labor income proles from the MEPS
dataset separately for all workers and for workers without ESHI coverage.34 Then, given
other parameters and equilibrium variables, we guess ht in Eq. (28) and the coecients
aE0t; a
E
1t; a
E
2t; a
E
3t; a
E
4
	
in Eq. (27). Next, we feed the resulting productivity and the ESHI
oer probability into our model. After solving and simulating the model, we compute
the average labor income prole of all workers and workers without ESHI and the ESHI
coverage prole in our model and compare them with the proles from the data. Then,
we update our guesses and reiterate until i) the labor income proles generated by our
model are the same as in the data for all workers and for workers not covered by ESHI
for each health group (Figure (3) and Figure (4)); ii) the proles of ESHI coverage in the
model are the same as in the data for each health group (the low right panel of Figures (6)
and (7)); iii) the probability of being insured by ESHI in the current period conditional
on being insured by ESHI in the previous period is the same in the model and in the
data.35 The advantage of this approach is that we can reconstruct the productivity and
33The parameters for the stochastic component of the productivity process that we take from other
studies were estimated on a sample of working individuals. If there is a selection into employment,
these estimates can be biased. We can correct this bias by estimating the underlying parameters inside
our model. However, this structural estimation will be complicated by the fact that we have to solve
simultaneously for a general equilibrium. Therefore, estimating (; 2 ; 
2
; 
2
 ; 
2
v1) inside the model
would signicantly increase our computational costs. Our approach is the same as in French (2005), and
French and Jones (2011). See also Capatina (2015) for a structural estimation of these parameters in a
partial equilibrium model.
34Household labor income is dened as the sum of wages (variable WAGEP) and 75% of the income
from business (variable BUSNP).
35Based on our experiments, for a given set of model parameters, there seems to be a unique set of
coecients dening ht and ut that can match the proles in the data. French (2005) provides a discussion
of identication of ht . The identication of ut is straightforward, given that the ESHI take-up rate is
96% in the data (and 99% in our model). The coecients aE0t; a
E
1t; a
E
2t and a
E
3t are pinned down by the
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the opportunity to access ESHI for individuals whom we do not observe working in the
data, most of whom are Medicaid enrollees.
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Figure 3: Average labor income of workers (data and model), and of everyone (model). The latter
prole takes into account the unobserved productivity of those people who do not work. The average
income of the healthy at age 30 is normalized to one.
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Figure 4: Average labor income of workers with and without ESHI coverage (data and model). The
average income of the healthy at age 30 is normalized to one.
Figure (3) plots the labor income proles of workers observed in the data and simu-
lated by the model and compares them with the average potential labor income computed
for all non-disabled individuals in the model (dashed lines).36 The latter prole takes into
account the unobserved productivity of those people who do not work. The average la-
bor income of workers is higher than the average labor income that includes potential
proles of ESHI coverage; the labor income proles of workers without ESHI, aE4 , is used to match the
persistence of ESHI coverage.
36To obtain the age prole of labor income among workers (and workers without ESHI) in Figures (3)
and (4), we regress the labor income of workers (and workers without ESHI) on dummy variables of age
and year separately for the healthy and for the unhealthy. The average labor income of each age is the
resulting coecient on the dummy variable of the corresponding age.
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income of non-workers because people with low productivity tend to drop out from the
employment pool. Our estimates also show that unhealthy people are inherently less
productive.
Figure (4) compares the average labor income among workers with and without ESHI
coverage by health. Our model can capture well the empirical fact that workers who are
not covered by ESHI have signicantly lower income than do those who have ESHI cov-
erage. Note that in our calibration, we target the average income among workers without
ESHI. However, our model can still capture well the average income among workers with
ESHI, particularly the unhealthy group. In addition, our calibration strategy captures
the positive eect of the availability of ESHI on the probability to work, which is espe-
cially strong among low-income unhealthy individuals. In particular, among unhealthy
workers with labor income below 400% of FPL, 56% receive an ESHI oer. In contrast,
among unhealthy non-workers with potential labor income below 400% of FPL, only 15%
would receive an ESHI oer if they choose to work. This dierence in probability of re-
ceiving an ESHI oer is signicantly smaller for the healthy; the corresponding numbers
are 57% for workers and 52% for non-workers.37
The model parametrization is summarized in Table 11 in Appendix A.
5 Baseline model performance
Tables 3 and 4 show how the fraction of workers and the aggregate health insurance
statistics among non-disabled individuals aged 25-61 years old produced by our model
compare to the data. Our model closely tracks all of the aggregate statistics, including
the fraction of the unhealthy in dierent insurance categories. In addition, our calibration
strategy allows the model to match the targeted age proles of employment by health
(left panel of Figure (5)) and the targeted insurance coverage by health (Figures (6)-(7)).
The right panel of Figure (5) shows the fraction of workers among people with and
without Medicaid coverage. In addition, the last two rows of Table 3 report the fraction
of workers among Medicaid enrollees by health status. Note that we do not target these
statistics in our calibration, but our model can still replicate these moments.
Our quantitative analysis in the next section depends on the extensive margin elastic-
ity of labor supply in our model. To calculate the elasticity, we compute the percentage
change in the fraction of workers in response to a one percent permanent increase in
37There is no dierence in the probability to receive an ESHI oer between workers and non-workers
with income (potential income) above 400% of FPL (for both the healthy and the unhealthy).
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Data Baseline model
By health status
all 91:5 94:8
healthy 94:1 98:4
unhealthy 79:8 78:5
By insurance
w/o Medicaid 93:8 97:8
with Medicaid 51:6 51:2
- healthy 61:2 76:1
- unhealthy 39:2 30:5
Table 3: Fraction of workers among non-disabled individuals aged 25-61 (data vs baseline model)
Data Baseline model
ESHI individual uninsured public ESHI individual uninsured public
all 63.3 4.7 26.2 5.7 63.4 5.4 24.9 6.3
healthy 66.9 5.0 24.1 4.0 66.9 5.9 23.7 3.5
unhealthy 47.7 3.5 35.2 13.6 47.2 3.1 30.5 19.2
% unhealthy by insurance 13.7 13.2 24.5 43.2 13.2 10.2 21.7 54.5
Table 4: Insurance coverage among non-disabled individuals aged 25-61 (data vs baseline model)
labor productivity in the partial equilibrium. The resulting extensive margin elasticity is
0.17 for the entire working-age population; the elasticity among the unhealthy (0.46) is
higher than that of the healthy (0.12). Our elasticities are in line with estimates in the
empirical literature; quasi-experimental studies usually nd that elasticities for dierent
subgroups of the population lie within the range of 0.13-0.43, and elasticities are higher
for groups who are less attached to the labor force.38
6 Results
6.1 Characteristics of non-working Medicaid beneciaries
To understand if the Medicaid program signicantly distorts labor supply decisions,
we start by analyzing the productivity of those Medicaid enrollees who do not work.
Using our estimates of the unobserved productivity among non-workers, we can measure
the fraction of Medicaid beneciaries whose potential labor income is above the income
test limit. The second row of Table 5 shows that 25.3% of all Medicaid beneciaries
have potential income above the income test limit and thus will lose eligibility if they
start working. An important observation is that the fraction of people whose potential
38See Chetty et al. (2012) for an extensive review and discussion about the empirical estimates of the
extensive margin elasticity.
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Figure 5: Employment proles among non-disabled individuals (data vs baseline model). Left panel:
employment by health. Right panel: employment for individuals with and without Medicaid coverage.
income is above the income test limit is noticeably higher among the unhealthy (36.4%
compared with 12.2% for the healthy).
% of all enrollees % of healthy enrollees % of unhealthy enrollees
non-workers (baseline) 51.9 28.5 71.8
enrollees with potential
income > income test
limit
25.3 12.2 36.4
non-workers ) workers
if not losing eligibility
22.9 11.1 32.9
Table 5: Decomposition of Medicaid beneciaries (non-disabled, age 25-64)
Given that a substantial fraction of Medicaid beneciaries will lose eligibility if they
work, an important question is whether Medicaid actually induced them to stop working.
To understand to what extent the decision not to work of people with relatively high
productivity is aected by Medicaid, we run the following experiment. We consider a
partial equilibrium environment where we allow people who are currently on Medicaid
to keep their eligibility for one period regardless of their income. In other words, people
who are enrolled in Medicaid in the baseline economy become \vested" for one period;
they cannot lose their eligibility even when their income exceeds the income test. The
change in the labor supply behavior of Medicaid enrollees in this experiment allows us to
evaluate to what extent the possibility of losing Medicaid eligibility aects their decisions
in the baseline case. The last row of Table 5 shows that 22.9% of all Medicaid enrollees
will choose to work in this experiment.
To understand better the dierence between Medicaid beneciaries who stop working
to gain eligibility and the other Medicaid beneciaries, Table 6 compares their medical
expenses, potential labor income and assets. The average medical expenses of people who
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Figure 6: Insurance status among healthy non-disabled individuals (data vs baseline model)
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Figure 7: Insurance status among unhealthy non-disabled individuals (data vs baseline model)
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choose not to work to become eligible for Medicaid are noticeably higher than the average
medical expenses of the rest of Medicaid beneciaries ($7,926 vs $6,359). At the same
time, the former group is signicantly more productive; their potential labor income is
around 50% higher than the potential labor income of the latter group. Importantly, the
group of beneciaries who do not work to meet the eligibility criteria, on average, holds
signicantly more assets than the rest of Medicaid beneciaries ($14,229 vs $2,790). As a
result, the former group is better self-insured; the average share of their medical expenses
in total potential resources (assets plus potential labor income) is signicantly lower
than this share for the rest of Medicaid beneciaries (32.9% vs 71.4%). To summarize,
Medicaid beneciaries who do not work to obtain access to public insurance are mostly
unhealthy people with high medical expenses but with relatively high potential labor
income and more assets compared with other Medicaid enrollees.
medical expenses potential earning asset medical expense
potential cash-on-hand
non-workers ) workers if
not losing eligibility
$7,926 $9,871 $14,229 32.9%
other Medicaid beneciaries $6,359 $6,116 $2,790 71.4%
all Medicaid $6,719 $7,217 $5,415 53.2%
Table 6: Medicaid enrollees who would work if they could keep Medicaid eligibility vs other enrollees
(non-disabled, age 25-64)
6.2 Welfare eects
The previous section shows that Medicaid substantially distorts labor supply deci-
sions, particulary among unhealthy people. These distortions can negatively aect wel-
fare for several reasons. First, some people with relatively high productivity do not work.
Second, some people receiving public transfers have good opportunities to self-insure. At
the same time, the size of public transfers received by this group is large because of
their high medical expenses. This section evaluates the welfare costs of these distortions.
An important observation is that the labor supply distortions happen because Medicaid
eligibility depends on labor income which is endogenous. People who want to obtain
public insurance but whose labor income is too high have the option to stop working.
This type of behavior (moral hazard) can be eliminated if Medicaid eligibility is based
on exogenous productivity. Thus, to evaluate the welfare eects of the distortions, we
assume that productivity is observable and modify the Medicaid eligibility as follows:
ktr + ew zht l  ycat and kt  kcat for categorical eligibility,
ktr + ew zht l   xht  yMN and kt  kMN for the Medically Needy program. (30)
31
Thus, Medicaid eligibility depends on the potential labor income of an individual but
not on his current labor income (i.e., there is no private information). In other words,
even when an individual has zero labor income because he does not work, he will not be
eligible if his productivity allows him to earn more than the income test limit. To be
consistent, we also set eligibility for the Medically Needy program based on the potential
labor income. We refer to this experiment as the observable productivity case and it will
be a benchmark for our policy discussions in the next section.
To evaluate welfare eects from implementing this new eligibility criterion, we main-
tain the total budget of the government transfers as in the baseline. To do this, we adjust
the income eligibility thresholds ycat and yMN until the total spending on Medicaid and
the minimum consumption guarantee for the working-age population in the experimental
case is the same as in the baseline economy. This way our welfare analysis measures wel-
fare eects from removing distortions and reallocating the xed public transfers rather
than changing the size of the redistribution in the economy.39
Baseline Observable
productivity
Income test: ycat; yMN (%FPL) 70.5% 96.8%
Income tax:  y 6.66% 6.43%
% Employment rate (non-disable, aged 25-64)
- all 93.9 95.4
- healthy 97.7 98.2
- unhealthy 76.9 82.7
% aggregate labor productivity   0.40
% aggregate capital   0.84
% aggregate output   0.55
Ex-ante consumption equivalent (%)   1.17
Table 7: The eects of removing Medicaid distortions on the labor supply
Tables 7 and 8 compare an economy where eligibility is based on productivity with
the baseline economy. After implementing the new eligibility criteria, non-workers with
relatively high potential labor income can no longer enroll in the Medicaid program.
Given that many of these people have relatively high medical expenses, this signicantly
39Since households change their labor supply and saving decisions, we also slightly adjust the propor-
tional income tax y to balance the government budget. In Appendix D, we consider an alternative setup
where, instead of adjusting the income eligibility threshold to maintain the size of the public transfer
programs, we only adjust y to balance the government budget. The qualitative conclusions in this case
stay the same.
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Baseline Observable productivity
ESHI individual uninsured public ESHI individual uninsured public
all 63.5 5.6 24.3 6.5 62.8 5.8 22.8 8.6
healthy 67.1 6.2 23.0 3.7 66.3 6.4 20.8 6.4
unhealthy 47.3 3.1 30.2 19.4 46.8 3.2 31.5 18.6
Table 8: The eects of removing Medicaid distortions on the labor supply: change in insurance coverage
(non-disabled, age 25-64)
decreases Medicaid spending. To maintain the same level of public transfers, this freed-
up budget is used to cover more people with truly low productivity; the income test limit
increases from 70.5% to 96.8% of FPL, and the percentage of people enrolled in Medicaid
increases from 6.5% to 8.6%.
To measure welfare in this experiment, we use an ex-ante consumption equivalence
that captures long-run welfare gains.40 Eliminating the labor supply distortions results
in sizeable welfare gains; a newborn individual in the baseline economy is willing to
give up 1.17% of his annual consumption every period to be born in the economy where
productivity is observable. Note that the increase in labor supply has only a marginal
contribution to these welfare gains. Although employment among the unhealthy increases
from 76.9% to 82.7%, the aggregate labor productivity, aggregate employment, aggregate
output and capital increase only slightly. Most of the welfare gains come from the more
ecient use of Medicaid spending. As shown in the previous subsection, people who
lose eligibility if their potential labor income is observable are relatively well self-insured
due to high earning capacity and the ability to accumulate relatively high assets. On
the other hand, the new enrollees have fewer opportunities to self-insure, and private
insurance premiums and medical costs constitute a large fraction of their resources. Thus,
reallocating public transfers from the former group to the latter improves welfare.41
40The ex-ante welfare criterion is commonly used in the NDPF literature. Let V B and V E denote
the value function of a newborn in the baseline and the experimental economy, respectively. The welfare
gains x can be dened as
x = 100 
"
1 

V B
V E
 1
(1 )
#
The resulting number represents the percentage of annual consumption a newborn in the experimental
economy is willing to give up to be indierent between the baseline and experimental economies. The
positive number implies welfare gains.
41In Appendix D, we show that in the alternative setup, when we only adjust y, the welfare gains
are equal to 0.18% of annual consumption. The gains are smaller because the savings from withdrawing
public transfers from people with high potential income are allocated to the whole population in terms
of reduced taxes as opposed to the relatively poor people in the benchmark case.
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7 Policy discussion
The previous section shows that if productivity is observable, Medicaid can provide
insurance to people with truly low productivity without distorting work incentives and
that this can substantially improve welfare. An important question is how to improve
the trade-o between insurance and incentives in an environment where productivity is
unobservable. The ecient provision of insurance in dynamic economies with private
information has been extensively studied by the New Dynamic Public Finance literature.
One important result from this literature is that to correct the incentive problem when
stochastic productivity is unobservable, saving decisions should be distorted. Golosov and
Tsyvinski (2006) show that in the case of disability insurance, the optimal wedge on sav-
ings can be achieved by asset testing. The intuition behind this result is that individuals
who falsely claim disability accumulate assets beforehand to smooth their consumption
when not working and receiving disability transfers. Asset testing makes this strategy
unattractive because able individuals with low assets are better o by working. Medicaid
has an insurance-incentives trade-o similar to disability insurance. It provides transfers
to low-income people, but it cannot separate truly low-productive individuals from non-
workers with high productivity. In this section, we explore whether asset testing can be
an ecient tool to correct incentives in the case of the Medicaid program.
We start by investigating the eects of changing the existing asset limit in Section
7.1. We show that asset testing creates a trade-o between lower distortions on the
labor supply and higher saving distortions, which does not allow it to achieve the same
welfare gains as the benchmark case of observable productivity. In Section 7.2, we take
this analysis one step further by exploring the possibility of using dierent asset limits
for workers and non-workers. We show that this policy is as eective in reducing labor
supply distortions as is uniform asset testing, but it does not create unnecessary saving
distortions. As a result, the welfare gains of this policy are almost equivalent to the
benchmark case of observable productivity.42
42We assume that an asset test is perfectly enforceable, i.e., individuals cannot hide their assets.
Although in theory, it is possible to hide some assets from the Medicaid program's administrators, there
is evidence that asset tests are enforced. Gruber and Yelowitz (1999) examine the expansion of the
Medicaid program over the 1984-1993 period and show that public insurance crowds out private savings
and that this eect is much stronger in the presence of an asset test. Sullivan (2006) nds a sizeable eect
of eliminating vehicles from countable assets when determining eligibility for welfare or increasing vehicle
exemption limits on vehicle ownership. Ganong and Liebman (2013) calculated that the removing asset
test from the food stamps program in the 2000s increases enrollment of people with assets above the
previously existing limit by 560,000. Importantly, if we assume that in our baseline economy, an asset
test is not enforceable, we can show that the welfare gains of tightening the asset limit are even larger,
making a stronger case for using and enforcing an asset test in means-tested programs as an important
policy implication.
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7.1 (Uniform) Asset testing
To understand the role of asset testing in reducing labor supply distortions, we start
by considering the eects of removing asset testing in two economies: i) with unobservable
productivity, and ii) with observable productivity. In other words, in the rst economy,
eligibility for Medicaid is determined according to the following rule:
ktr + ew zht lt  ycat for categorical eligibility,
ktr + ew zht lt   xht  yMN and kt  kMN for the Medically Needy program;
while in the second economy, the eligibility criteria looks as follows:
ktr + ew zht l  ycat for categorical eligibility,
ktr + ew zht l   xht  yMN and kt  kMN for the Medically Needy program.
In both cases, we keep the asset test for the Medically Needy program as in the baseline
to maintain the role of this program as ex-post insurance for impoverished people with
no resources to pay for their medical costs. As in the previous section, we x the welfare
budget by adjusting the income test (ycat and yMN). The results of these experiments
are reported in Rows 1 and 2 of Table 9 for the economy with observable productivity
and in Rows 3 and 4 for the economy where productivity is unobservable.
Asset test (kCAT )
Income test CEV Employment (%) Insurance (%)
(%FPL) (%) unhealthy healthy unins pub ind ESHI
Productivity is observed
1. No asset test 93.2 1.41 82.3 98.1 23.3 8.3 5.6 62.8
2. $26,000 (bench-
mark)
96.7 1.17 82.7 98.2 22.8 8.6 5.8 62.8
Productivity is unobserved
3. No asset test 11.7 -0.12 75.0 97.4 24.6 6.3 5.6 63.5
4. $26,000 (baseline) 70.5 - 76.9 97.7 24.3 6.5 5.6 63.5
5. $23,000 84.7 0.46 79.2 98.0 23.4 7.5 5.8 63.3
6. $20,000 89.4 0.64 80.1 98.0 23.1 7.9 5.8 63.2
7. $15,000 93.7 0.67 80.8 98.1 22.8 8.2 6.0 63.0
8. $10,000 97.8 0.69 81.4 98.2 22.2 8.4 6.4 63.0
8. $5,000 105.8 0.64 82.3 98.2 21.9 8.8 6.5 62.9
9. $2,000 108.1 0.45 81.9 98.1 22.9 8.4 5.7 63.1
Table 9: Eects of (uniform) asset testing (non-disabled, age 25-64)
Removing asset testing has very dierent eects depending on whether productivity
is observable. In an economy where productivity is observable, removing asset testing
increases welfare gains from 1.17% (our benchmark full information economy) to 1.41%.
This happens because asset testing creates distortions on saving decisions that are not
35
needed when there is no private information. In contrast, if productivity is unobserv-
able, eliminating asset testing leads to welfare losses equivalent to -0.12% of the annual
consumption. This happens because the distortions on the labor supply created by Medi-
caid become more severe. More people with relatively high productivity and high medical
costs, who previously could not enroll in Medicaid because of their high assets, now stop
working and become eligible for the program. Given their high medical expenses, this
increases the spending of the Medicaid program. To keep the welfare budget xed as in
the baseline economy, the income eligibility threshold has to be decreased from 70.5% to
11.7% of FPL. The fraction of beneciaries who would start working if they can keep eligi-
bility increases to 31% (from 22.9% in the baseline economy). This experiment illustrates
the important role that asset testing plays in preventing people who have relatively high
productivity and are well self-insured from obtaining free public insurance by changing
their labor supply.
In the next set of experiments, we gradually decrease the asset limit in the baseline
economy from $26,000 to $2,000 to understand whether this can reduce the labor supply
distortions and move the economy closer to the benchmark case of observable productiv-
ity. As before, in each experiment, we x the size of the welfare budget by adjusting the
income eligibility threshold for Medicaid (ycat, yMN). The left panel of Figure (8) shows
that lowering the asset limit from $26,000 (baseline level) to $2,000 almost completely
eliminates the moral hazard problem; the percentage of Medicaid enrollees who choose
not to work to obtain eligibility drops to around 1% (solid line). Rows 5 to 9 of Table 9
show the eects of the tighter asset testing on employment and insurance statistics. The
employment rate among the unhealthy increases from 76.9% to 81.9%, which is closer to
the benchmark economy where productivity is observable (82.7%). However, although in
terms of employment, the economy with a $2,000 asset limit is close to the benchmark
economy with observable productivity, it brings signicantly lower welfare gains; 0.45%
of the annual consumption compared with 1.17% in the benchmark economy (second row
of Table 9). This is because the positive eect of eliminating labor supply distortions
is partially oset by the negative eect of large saving distortions created by the tight
asset test: many low-income people accumulate fewer assets to meet the eligibility re-
quirements. The solid line in the right panel of Figure (8) shows that the percentage of
people aged 25-64 with assets below $2,000 increases from around 14% in the baseline
economy to almost 17% in the economy with a very tight asset test.43
The trade-o between labor supply and saving distortions results in non-linear welfare
changes when tightening asset testing, as shown in the left panel of Figure (9) for a
newborn individual (solid line) and in the right panel of Figure (9) for a 25-year-old
43Gruber and Yelowitz (1999) also nd that asset testing has a sizeable negative eect on savings of
Medicaid enrollees.
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Figure 8: Labor supply distortions vs saving distortions. Left panel: non-working beneciaries who
would choose to work if allowed to keep Medicaid eligibility (% of all enrollees). Right panel: the
percentage of individuals with assets below $2,000 (% of all individuals between ages 25 and 64). Solid
line: uniform asset testing; crossed line: work-dependent asset testing
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Figure 9: Welfare eects of asset testing. Left panel: the ex-ante CEV of a person aged 25. Right
panel: the CEV of a person aged 25 after realizing the xed productivity type (). The lines without
crosses are for uniform asset testing, and those with crosses are for work-dependent asset testing.
individual with a low (high) xed productivity type (solid and dashed lines for low and
high type, respectively). Notice that the non-linear pattern of welfare gains is more
pronounced among people with low xed productivity. Since people in this group are
more likely to rely on public health insurance, their saving decisions are more aected by
asset testing. Note that in this set of experiments, the highest ex-ante welfare is achieved
if asset limit is equal to $10,000. In this case, the distortions on the labor supply are less
compared with the baseline case, and the distortions on saving decisions are less than in
the case of a $2,000 asset limit. As a result, the welfare gains are higher than in both
the baseline and in the $2,000 asset limit economy (0.69% of the annual consumption)
but are still signicantly smaller than in the case of observable productivity.
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7.2 Work-dependent asset testing
The previous section shows that strict asset testing can almost entirely eliminate
distortions on the labor supply of Medicaid beneciaries but at a cost of substantially
distorting saving decisions. In this section, we consider a more exible asset testing
policy that allows asset limits to depend on labor supply decisions. The rationale for
this policy is based on the nding in the NDPF literature that one way to reduce the
adverse eect of savings on work incentives is to introduce income-dependent wealth taxes
(Kocherlakota, 2005, Albanesi and Sleet, 2006). The intuition here is as follows. Highly
productive individuals can always mimic low productive individuals by working less. The
attractiveness of this strategy increases with asset holding since wealth can substitute for
forgone labor income. To make this behavior less attractive, an individual who reports
low income should face higher marginal taxes on wealth. In our case, individuals with high
and low productivity are observationally identical only when they do not work. Thus,
asset testing (which is equivalent to a wealth tax) should be stricter for non-workers. In
the next set of experiments, we allow asset limits to be dierent for working and non-
working Medicaid enrollees.44 Table 10 shows how policies that tighten the asset limit for
non-workers from $26,000 (baseline) to $2,000, while keeping the asset limit for workers
unchanged at the baseline level, aect employment and insurance. The crossed line in
the left panel of Figure (8) shows that stricter asset testing for non-workers is eective
in reducing moral hazard behavior among Medicaid beneciaries; when the asset limit
is set to $2,000, only around 1% of enrollees would choose to work if they could keep
their eligibility. The crossed line in the left panel of Figure (9) shows that tightening the
asset limit for non-workers increases welfare, and when the asset limit is set to $2,000,
welfare gains approach the level of the full information benchmark (1.13% compared to
1.17% in the latter case).45 As shown by the crossed line in the right panel of Figure
(8), in contrast to uniform asset testing, work-dependent asset testing does not create
signicant saving distortions. With the asset limit at $2,000, the percentage of people
aged 25 to 64 years old with assets below $2,000 is 12%, which is the same as in the
benchmark economy with observable productivity and signicantly lower compared with
the economy with a $2,000 asset limit for both workers and non-workers (17%). Thus,
by allowing working and non-working Medicaid enrollees to face dierent asset limits, we
can achieve almost the same outcome as in the \ideal" case of linking Medicaid eligibility
to unobservable productivity.
44In Appendix F, we discuss how a work-dependent asset testing policy would look like if individuals
were allowed to adjust their labor supply along the intensive margin.
45In Appendix E, we show that completely removing asset testing of workers results in welfare gains
that are slightly higher and close to the welfare gains in the economy with observable productivity and
no asset testing.
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Asset test (kCAT ) Income Test CEV employment (%) insurance (%)
for non-workers (%FPL) (%) unhealthy healthy unins pub Ind ESHI
1. $26,000 (baseline) 70.5 - 76.9 97.7 24.3 6.5 5.6 63.5
2. $23,000 84.9 0.505 79.5 98.0 23.4 7.6 5.8 63.2
3. $20,000 89.3 0.740 80.8 98.1 23.2 8.0 5.8 63.1
4. $15,000 93.2 0.943 82.3 98.2 22.9 8.4 5.8 62.9
5. $10,000 95.6 1.061 83.5 98.3 22.7 8.6 5.8 62.8
6. $5,000 96.9 1.130 85.0 98.4 22.7 8.7 5.8 62.8
7. $2,000 97.4 1.135 85.4 98.4 22.7 8.7 5.9 62.8
Table 10: Eects of work-dependent asset testing (non-disabled, age 25-64).
8 Relationship with recent empirical studies
Recently, several empirical studies have addressed the question of the eect of public
health insurance on labor supply using changes in the Medicaid state expansion programs
in dierent states. In this section, we argue that even though these studies reach opposite
conclusions, they can be reconciled in light of our ndings.
Garthwaite et al. (2014) consider the changes in Tenncare, the state expansion pro-
gram for childless adults in Tennessee. Tenncare was launched in 1994, but in 2005 due to
state budget problems, around 170,000 adults were disenrolled from this program within
a period of several months. Garthwaite et al. (2014) nd that there was a large increase
in employment among disenrolled individuals.
Dague et al. (2013) study the BadgerCare Plus Core Plan, the state Medicaid expan-
sion program for childless adults in Wisconsin. This program was launched in January
2009. However, several months later, the enrollment was frozen because the number of
applications signicantly exceeded that planned in the program budget. Those people
who applied after the enrollment freeze were placed on a waiting list. The authors com-
pare the labor market outcome of those people who entered the program before the freeze
with the outcome of people who were placed on the waiting list. They nd that public
health insurance enrollment led to a sizeable and statistically signicant reduction in
employment probability.
Finally, Baicker et al. (2014) use the data from the Oregon Health Insurance exper-
iment to evaluate the eect of Medicaid on labor supply. In 2008, Oregon introduced
a limited expansion of its Medicaid program through a lottery. Individuals selected by
a lottery were given an opportunity to enroll in Medicaid if they met certain eligibility
requirements. The authors do not nd a signicant dierence in terms of labor supply
between the group who won the lottery and enrolled in Medicaid and the group who did
not win the lottery.
An important observation is that neither Tenncare nor BadgerCare Plus had asset
testing for its enrollees. In contrast, individuals who won the lottery in Oregon had to
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meet a strict asset limit of $2,000 to be able to enroll in Medicaid.46 As our results in
section 7.1 show, imposing an asset limit of $2,000 can almost entirely eliminate moral
hazard behavior among Medicaid beneciaries; thus, the eect of Medicaid on labor
supply should be small or not signicant. In contrast, when there is no asset testing, the
problem of moral hazard among Medicaid beneciaries can be considerable, i.e., many
individuals reduce their labor supply to enroll in Medicaid. In this light, the opposite
ndings in these empirical studies can be attributed to dierent asset testing policies for
the Medicaid expansion programs in the three states.
9 Conclusion
In this paper, we illustrate the important role of asset testing in improving the incen-
tives of means-tested programs in the asymmetric information environment. The eligibil-
ity for means-tested programs depends on endogenous labor income, meaning that people
who do not work can become eligible even when their productivity is relatively high. We
focus on Medicaid, one of the largest means-tested programs in the US, and we show
that in the asymmetric information environment, the labor supply distortions caused
by Medicaid's income testing are quantitatively important; around 23% of Medicaid en-
rollees would choose to work if they could keep public insurance. These distortions result
in large welfare losses; if we remove asymmetric information and allow the participation
in Medicaid to be based on (unobservable) exogenous productivity, the ex-ante welfare
gains would be equivalent to 1.17% of annual consumption. These gains arise from the
improved allocation of limited public resources; public transfers are reallocated from non-
working Medicaid enrollees with relatively high potential earnings to people with truly
low productivity. We show that strict uniform asset testing can almost entirely elimi-
nate the labor supply distortions created by Medicaid but at a cost of distorting saving
decisions. To achieve an outcome close to the \ideal" full information case (observable
productivity), asset limits should be dierent for workers and non-workers. This happens
because imposing strict asset testing on Medicaid beneciaries who work is redundant
and only distorts their saving decisions.
Note that the framework developed in this paper can be used to study other means-
tested programs apart from Medicaid. In particular, such programs as Temporary Assis-
tance for Needy Families (TANF), food stamps, and SSI base their eligibility on earnings
and thus can also distort labor supply decisions. Our nding that work-dependent asset
testing can improve upon the situation with no asset testing or that with uniform asset
testing is likely to apply to these programs as well. Our approach can be used to quantify
46Source: Wooldridge et al. (1996) for Tenncare, Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured
(2010) for BadgerCare Plus, and Baicker et al. (2014) for the Oregon lottery.
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the eects of asset testing polices in these programs. Our model can also be extended
to allow for intensive labor supply adjustments, in which case it can be used to analyze
a wider range of programs, for example, Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC), a program
that is designed to increase labor supply among low-income people.
We see two important future extensions of our work. First is to understand how
Medicaid interacts with other public programs, in particular, disability insurance. More
specically, what is the joint eect of Medicaid and disability insurance on work incen-
tives? The detailed modeling of these two programs is a non-trivial extension, but it will
allow for an extensive policy analysis. In particular, it will allow answering the follow-
ing questions. Does decreasing the size of the moral hazard problem in Medicaid aect
the number of applicants falsely claiming disability insurance? How do changes in the
screening process of the disability insurance program aect the size of the moral hazard
problem in Medicaid? Is it possible to reduce the disincentives of the two programs
simultaneously while maintaining the amount of insurance they provide?
Second, we consider it an important extension to understand how the changes in-
troduced by the Aordable Care Act (ACA) will aect the work incentives of Medicaid
beneciaries. This reform, which began to be implemented in 2014, has several pro-
visions that are likely to aect the incentives of the publicly insured. First, the ACA
eliminates asset testing of Medicaid beneciaries. As we show in the paper, this nega-
tively aects work incentives. At the same time, the reform introduces community rating
in the individual market and subsidies for people buying individual health insurance.
This facilitates access to private health insurance and thus decreases the attractiveness
of Medicaid. Our framework can be extended to quantify the importance of these two
forces and their net eect on work incentives.
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Appendix
A Summary of the parametrization of the baseline
model
Parameter name Notation Value Source
Parameters set outside the model
Consumption share { 0.6 French (2005)
Cobb-Douglas parameter  0.33 capital share in output
Depreciation rate  0.085 investment-GDP ratio
Population growth  0.7% % people older than 65
Labor supply l 0.4
Tax function parameters a0 0.258 Gouveia and Strauss (1994)
a1 0.768 "
Disability payment DI $4,920 average Social Security payments among the disabled (25-61)
Medicare premium pmed $1,055 total premiums =2.11% of Y
Asset limit for Medically Needy kMN $2,000 data
Employer contribution  80.0%
Labor productivity
- Persistence parameter  0.98 Storesletten, et al (2000)
- Variance of innovations 2" 0.02 "
- Temporary shock 2 0.057 "
- Fixed eect 2 0.242 "
Parameters used to match some targets
Discount factor  0.9965 K
Y
= 2:7
Risk aversion  2.50 age-prole of individually insured
Fixed costs of work w 0.28 employment proles (healthy)
Consumption oor c $1,540 % employment among Medicaid enrolles
Tax function parameter a2 0.616 balanced government budget
Proportional tax  y 6.66% composition of tax revenue
Proportional load in ESHI/ind ins  1.071 % individually insured prole
Fixed loads in ind insurance 'h
- healthy $101 % individually insured prole (healthy)
- unhealthy $2,100 % individually insured prole (unhealthy)
Medicaid
- Income test yCAT , yMN 0:705FPL % publicly insured
- Categorial asset test kCAT $26,000 % Medicaid enrollees with assets below $10,000
Table 11: Parameters in baseline model
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B Estimation of survival probabilities
To construct the survival probabilities by health, we follow Attanasio et al. (2011).
We use the HRS data to estimate the survival probability as a function of a cubic polyno-
mial of age and gender, using a probit model for each health status. Then, we compute the
survival premium - the dierence between the estimated survival probabilities of healthy
and unhealthy males for each age. From the Social Security Administration life table,
we know the average survival probability of males. From the MEPS, we can construct
the fraction of people in the two health categories for each age. Using this information,
we can recover the survival probabilities of healthy and unhealthy people for each age.
Figure (10) plots the survival probability by health status.
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Figure 10: Survival probability (t)
C Medical expenses and insurance coverage
To calibrate medical expenses, we separate our sample into 12 age groups (20-24, 25-
29, 30-34, ..., 75+). We assign the age of each group to the mid-point of the corresponding
age interval. For example, 22 for 20-24, 27 for 25-29, 32 for 30-34, etc. For each year, we
divide medical expenditures into 3 bins corresponding to the bottom 50th, 50-95th, and
top 5th percentiles for each health status and age group. To obtain a value of medical
expenses in each bin, we run a regression of medical expenses on a set of age group
and year dummies. The coecients on age dummies in this regression are the average
medical expenses for the corresponding age in a particular bin. Then, we t our estimated
coecients with a quadratic function of age. The resulting numbers are multiplied by
1.60 for people younger than 65 years old and by 1.90 for people who are 65 or older
to make medical spending in our model consistent with the aggregate medical spending
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in NHEA as explained in Section 4.6. Figure (11) shows the medical cost for each grid
separately for healthy and unhealthy individuals. Table 12 reports the medical shock
process transition matrices for people younger than 65 years old and for people who are
65 or older.
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Figure 11: Medical expense grids by health status, xht
xt(1) xt(2) xt(3)
xt 1(1) 0.756 0.227 0.017
xt 1(2) 0.359 0.591 0.050
xt 1(3) 0.221 0.616 0.163
xt(1) xt(2) xt(3)
xt 1(1) 0.693 0.280 0.027
xt 1(2) 0.350 0.578 0.072
xt 1(3) 0.242 0.597 0.161
Table 12: Transition matrix of medical expenses. Left panel: for individuals younger than 65. Right
panel: for individuals who are 65 or older.
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Figure 12: Fraction of medical costs covered by private insurance and Medicaid, q(xht ; it)
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To determine the fraction of medical expenses covered by private insurance and Med-
icaid q(xt; it), we do the following. For working-age households, we estimate medi-
cal expenditures paid by private insurers (variable TOTPRV) and Medicaid (variable
TOTMCD) as a function of total medical expenditures and year dummy variables. We
use a linear function of total medical expenditure for private insurance and a quadratic
function for Medicaid.47 Then, we convert our estimates into the fraction of expenditures
covered by insurers. Figure (12) plots the fraction of medical expenses covered by private
insurance and Medicaid.
D Economy with observable productivity when wel-
fare budget is not xed
In this section, we reevaluate the welfare eects of linking Medicaid eligibility to
exogenous productivity as in Section 6.2 (Eq. 30) but when total spending on welfare
programs (Medicaid and the consumption oor) is not held constant. Unlike in Section
6.2, we do not adjust the income eligibility threshold to keep the welfare budget un-
changed but only adjust  y to balance the government budget. Tables 13 and 14 report
the results from this experiment.
As before, there is a welfare gain from removing asymmetric information, but the size
of the gain is signicantly smaller: 0.18% of annual consumption compared with 1.17%
in Section 6.2. This happens because the size of the public transfers through Medicaid
decreases. In the experiment in Section 6.2, the freed-up budget from disenrolled Med-
icaid beneciaries with relatively high productivity is used to enroll more low-income
people. Now, this budget is proportionately distributed to everyone through lower taxes.
As a result, the income tax  y decreases from 6.66% to 6.30%, but the Medicaid program
shrinks; its coverage goes down from 6.5% (baseline) to 5.2%.
E Removing asset testing for workers
In Section 7.2, we show that tight asset testing for non-workers can almost entirely
eliminate moral hazard behavior among Medicaid beneciaries. In this section, we con-
sider the eects of the complete elimination of asset testing for workers while maintaining
the strict asset testing ($2,000) for non-workers. Row 3 of Table 15 reports the results
of this experiment. For comparison, we also report in Row 2 the results for an economy
47For both regressions, R2 is 0.88.
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Baseline Observable
productivity
Income test: ycat; yMN (%FPL) 70.5% 70.5%
Income tax:  y 6.66% 6.30%
Employment rate (non-disabled, 25-64) (%)
- all 93.9 95.4
- healthy 97.7 98.1
- unhealthy 76.9 81.5
% aggregate labor productivity   0.36
% aggregate capital   1.24
% aggregate output   0.65
Ex-ante consumption equivalent (%)   0.182
Table 13: Eects of removing Medicaid distortions on the labor supply (xed income test limit)
Baseline observable productivity
ESHI individual uninsured public ESHI individual uninsured public
all 63.5 5.6 24.3 6.5 63.6 5.6 25.6 5.2
healthy 67.1 6.2 23.0 3.7 67.2 6.2 23.4 3.3
unhealthy 47.3 3.1 30.2 19.4 47.5 3.1 35.7 13.7
Table 14: Change in insurance coverage (xed income test limit)
where productivity is observable and there is no asset testing. In both experiments, we
x the total budget of the welfare programs as in the baseline economy by adjusting the
income test limit.
Compared with the results in Table 10, the welfare gains are higher. This is because
asset testing of working beneciaries is unnecessary (since there is no moral hazard) and
it only creates saving distortions. Table 15 also shows that removing asset testing for
workers can achieve welfare gains close to the economy with observable productivity and
no asset testing (1.28% vs 1.41%).
Experiment
% non-worker)worker Income test Ex-ante CEV
if not losing eligibility (%FPL) (%)
1. Baseline 22.9 70.5  
2. Obs productivity, no asset
test
  93.2 1.414
3. Asset test ($2,000) only for
non-workers
1.36 93.2 1.276
Table 15: Welfare eects of the complete removal of asset testing when productivity is observable (Row
2) and the removal of asset testing for workers when productivity is unobservable (Row 3).
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F Earnings-dependent asset testing with intensive
margin of labor supply
In this paper, we assume that individuals adjust their labor supply only along the
extensive margin. We show that the distortions of Medicaid can be substantially reduced
if Medicaid eligibility includes asset testing that imposes dierent asset limits on workers
and non-workers. In this section, we discuss how this policy would look like if individuals
could also adjust their labor supply along the intensive margin.
When individuals can choose how much to work, Medicaid can distort not only partic-
ipation decisions but also decisions about hours worked. This happens if it is impossible
to infer productivity from observing the labor income and hours of working individuals.48
In this case, the asset limits can be linked to labor income as follows: the lower the labor
income, the tighter the asset test. The intuition here is the same as in the case of our
baseline model. When only extensive margin adjustment is possible, highly productive
individuals can pretend to be low productive by not working. If intensive margin can
also be adjusted, highly productive individuals can decrease their working hours, which
results in low labor income. As before, the strategy of mimicking low productivity is only
attractive for individuals who have enough assets to substitute forgone labor income when
decreasing their labor supply. Thus, tighter asset limits on those with low labor income
can discourage individuals with high productivity from enrolling into Medicaid.49
G Computational algorithm
In our computation, we discretize all continuous state variables. Since the value
function and policy functions are non-linear along the dimension of kt when kt is close to
zero, we use a much ner grid for small values of kt. Given the parameters of the model,
we solve for the steady state equilibrium of the baseline model as follows.
1. Guess an initial interest rate r, premium in the group insurance market p, the
amount the rm oering ESHI subtracts from the wage of their workers cE, tax parameter
a2, and bequest Beq.
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48This is the common assumption in the NDPF literature. It can happen either because hours are
observed imprecisely or because individuals can also adjust their eorts.
49Note that earnings-dependent asset limits are analogous to earnings-dependent wealth taxation, as
discussed in the NDPF literature. Albanesi and Sleet (2005) nd that optimal tax on wealth is a non-
linear function of labor income that increases steeply when labor income is close to zero. Therefore, it
is possible that in our case, asset limits can be a complicated non-linear function of labor income.
50In general, insurance markets where rms are not allowed to risk-adjust premiums, as in the group
market, can have multiple equilibriums. However, because the major part of the premium is contributed
by the employer, people are less sensitive to the price of insurance; thus, the multiplicity of equilibriums
becomes less of an issue. In particular, our equilibrium price tends to be invariant to the initial guess.
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2. Solve for the households' decision rules using backward induction. We evaluate the
value function for points outside the state space grid using a Piecewise Cubic Hermite
Interpolating Polynomial (PCHIP).
3. Given policy functions, simulate the households' distribution using a non-stochastic
method as in Young (2010).
4. Using the distribution of households and policy functions, check whether market
clearing conditions and zero prot conditions for insurance rms hold, and government
budget balances. If not, update r, p, cE, a2, and Beq, and repeat Steps 1-3.
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